The relation between organisms and machines is very old. Over a century ago, the French historian and philosopher Alfred Victor Espinas observed that from the Greeks onwards the intelligibility of the organic world presupposed a comparison with technical objects. Aristotle, for instance, associated living organs with mechanical artefacts in order to understand animals ‘movements. In the modern period, Descartes, Borelli and other mechanists defended the idea that organisms are, in reality, machines. Today, philosophers and scientists still argue (...) that the genome is like a software and the brain is like a computer. In this article I reconsider the relation between organisms and machines from the perspective of the German geographer and philosopher Ernst Kapp, one of the founding fathers of the Philosophy of Technology. Breaking with a long and venerable philosophical tradition, Kapp argued that machines are, in reality, “organic projections”. Organisms are not machines; they are an imitation or reflection of the organic world. First of all, I clarify the hypothesis of “organic projection”. Secondly, I consider some of the philosophical consequences that such a hypothesis entails over the debate between machinists and anti-mechanists. Finally, and following the previous considerations, I defend the importance of reconnecting the philosophy of technology with philosophy of biology in order to better understand the development of contemporary biology. (shrink)

I will begin by considering how the social world appears to the scientific observer and ask the question of whether the world of scientific research, with all its categories of meaning interpretation and with all its conceptual schemes of action, is identical with the world in which the observed actor acts. Anticipating the result, I may state immediately that with the shift from one level to the other, all the conceptual schemes and all the terms of interpretation must be modified.Proceeding (...) in this direction, I encounter several problems overlapping with the problem of rational action and the “rational act unit” in Professor ParsonsParsons, Talcott’ sense. First: The conceptual scheme of rational action presupposes a more or less definite knowledge of, or orientation within, the world in which this action is performed. In this sense the term, “rationality”, is not specific to the conceptual scheme of action; it embraces the conceptual scheme of the world in general and is only one element in it. Therefore, we also must examine the problem of orientation in this world. Second: We ought to keep in mind that all interpretation of the social world has to start from the actor’s subjective point of view. Therefore, we cannot accept the term, “unit act”, as such, without trying to reduce it to its subjective meaning. Here I have to discuss in general terms why I insist on the subjective point of view. This is more than the whim of a few social scientists; social science cannot be built up except by taking cognizance of the subjective meaning the actor connects with his acting. Finally, I have to discuss the fact that there are social sciences operating on high theoretical levels that, like economics, apparently prefer to deal with statistical curves and mathematical formulae rather than with actions of human beings in the social world, yet they use the term, “rational action”, as an indispensable element of their systems. I will have to show what modification this term undergoes in these types of social sciences..). (shrink)

S'il n'est pas un véritable juriste, Rousseau ne s'en est pas moins intéressé à de nombreux problèmes juridiques, du droit public romain au droit de la famille. La réflexion historique occupe également une place importante dans son oeuvre. Ce sont ces aspects moins connus de la pensée de Rousseau jurisconsulte et historien qui sont abordés dans ce volume, considérant aussi le rayonnement du citoyen de Genève dans l'histoire intellectuelle et politique occidentale. Inspirateur des révolutionnaires français, utilisé plus que compris, récupéré (...) par les uns, dénoncé par les autres, Rousseau a eu une influence sur nombre de penseurs politiques et de législateurs constitutionnels. Le présent ouvrage invite ainsi à suivre la trace de cette influence pour restituer à sa pensée politique la singularité comme l'ampleur de sa place dans l'histoire. (shrink)

Among them are essays by French philosophers Louis Bourdeau and Victor Espinas, which founded the ideas in the 1880s and 1890s.

This second volume completes the biography of the influential philosopher, following Whitehead's move first from Trinity College, Cambridge to London, and then, at the age of 63, to America, where the focus of his work shifted from mathematics to philosophy. Lowe (philosophy emeritus, Johns Hopkins U.) died in 1988 with this biography not quite completed. Vol.2 was edited and seen through publication by J.B. Schneewind, chairman of the Philosophy Department at Johns Hopkins. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Whitehead's Philosophy of Science By VICTOR LOWE BOTH AS AN INVESTIGATOR of the foundations of mathematics and as a philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead ...

Extrait : Toute la doctrine de Nietzsche repose sur la conception et l'adoration d'une sorte de déité métaphysique qu'il appelle la puissance. À la volonté de vie que Schopenhauer avait placée au coeur de l'être, il substitue « la volonté de pouvoir et de domination ». Nous retrouvons, dans cette idée de puissance en déploiement, la vieille notion romantique dont s'étaient nourris tous les littérateurs depuis Schlegel jusqu'à Victor Hugo, tous les philosophes depuis Fichte, Schelling et Hegel jusqu'à Schopenhauer. (...) Des forces qui se répandent sans autre but qu'elles-mêmes ou pour des buts qu'il leur plaît de poser, n'est-ce pas l'idée fondamentale par où le romantisme s'oppose à l'intellectualisme classique, aux notions d'ordre, de loi, d'harmonie, d'intelligibilité et, en un seul mot, d'intelligence? La puissance de l'orage et de la tempête qui tourbillonne sans raison, la puissance de l'océan qui se soulève sans rien atteindre, la puissance de la montagne... (shrink)

Jean-Luc MARION, De surcroît. Études sur les phénomènes saturés ; Magda KING, A Guide to Heidegger’s Being and Time ; Andreas MICHEL, Die französische Heidegger-Rezeption und ihre sprachlichen Konsequenzen ; Alfred DENKER, Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy ; John B. BROUGH & Lester EMBREE, The Many Faces of Time ; Daniel O. DAHLSTROM, Heidegger’s Concept of Truth ; Cristina LAFONT, Heidegger, Language, And World-Disclosure ; Eliane ESCOUBAS & Bernhard WALDENFELS, Phénoménologie française et phénoménologie allemande ; Eckard WOLZ-GOTTWALD, Transformation der (...) Phänomenologie. Zur Mystik bei Husserl und Heidegger ; Martin HEIDEGGER, Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity ; Arkadiusz CHRUDZIMSKI, Die Erkenntnistheorie von Roman Ingarden ; Jocelyn BENOIST, L’apriori conceptuel. Bolzano, Husserl, Schlick ; Dennis King KEENAN, Death and Responsibility. The “Work” of Levinas ; Dan ZAHAVI, Self-awareness, Temporality, and Alterity. Central Topics in Phenomenology ; Sonya SIKKA, Forms of Transcendence. Heidegger and Medieval Mystical Theology ; Alfred DENKER, Omdat filosoferen leven is. Een archeologie van Martin Heideggers Sein und Zeit; Seán HAND, The Levinas Reader ; ; Ion MINCÃ, Informatica şi teoria cunoaşterii. O paradigmã fenomenologicã a domeniului hardware ; John van BUREN, The Young Heidegger. Rumor of the Hidden King. (shrink)

This paper features Derk Pereboom’s replies to commentaries by Victor Tadros and Saul Smilansky on his non-retributive, incapacitation-focused proposal for treatment of dangerous criminals; by Michael McKenna on his manipulation argument against compatibilism about basic desert and causal determination; and by Alfred R. Mele on his disappearing agent argument against event-causal libertarianism.

In 1877, the young Alfred Espinas defended a philosophical study, ‘doctorat ès lettres’, at the Sorbonne University, entitled Des Sociétés animales. This was to become one of the principal sources of French organicist sociology. The paradox, however, is that this work seems to be fundamentally a study of natural science. Espinas tried to justify his position theoretically through two types of reciprocally exclusive and uncomplementary arguments. The first one consists in showing that only certain kinds of animal (...) groupings belong legitimately, if not academically, to sociology. The second one has a greater audacious and uncontrollable dimension. It consists in asserting that all pluricellular organisms are true societies. In this article we first focus on the role played by cellular theory in such a ‘sociologization’ of biology, concerning the extension of sociology. Second, we examine the importance of such confusion within the fields of extension, in aiming to explain the conceptual transfers between social sciences and life sciences, in the second half of the 19th century. (shrink)

This volume's aim is to clarify, criticize and theoretically develop some of Whitehead's major philosophic ideas and insights. Eighteen distinguished contributors follow Whitehead in his unique attempt to integrate the often disparate concerns of science , art, religion, social life and common sense. They manage to avoid the twin pitfalls of uncritical acceptance and impatient rejection of Whitehead's thought. They delineate Whitehead's indebtedness to and divergence from the philosophic traditions of Plato, Leibniz, Hume, Hegel, Bergson and others. Some of the (...) distinguished philosophers contributing to this volume are: Charles Hartshorne, William Ernest Hocking, Richard M. Rorty, Gregory Vlastos, William A. Christian, Sr., Nathaniel Lawrence, Ivor Leclerc, Victor Lowe, Robert M. Palter, and Donald W. Sherburne. Originally published in 1963 by Prentice-Hall, this edition contains a new preface by the editor. (shrink)

The article traces Nietzsche’s references to insects in his published and unpublished writings against the backdrop of his study of the entomological research of his time (esp. through his reading of Alfred Espinas’s Die thierischen Gesellschaften). The first part of the article explores how Nietzsche’s entomology allows us to add a posthumanist perspective to the more familiar poststructuralist readings of Nietzsche, as the entomological research he consulted offered him a model for understanding how rudimentary processes can lead to (...) the formation of structures and higher organizations with emergent properties. The second part of the article revisits Nietzsche’s conceptions of the will and the will to power against the backdrop of his references to insect sociality and the influence of Wilhelm Wundt. It shows that Nietzsche’s deconstruction of the will as an umbrella concept and his will to power are attempts to model the emergence of complex edifices from simple operations under which physical, psychological, and social phenomena must be thought to arise. The article concludes with a reflection of the social and political relevance of what Nietzsche identifies as modernity’s “disgregation of the will.”. (shrink)

The review shows how Guha reinstates the sacred within Eliot studies in India. Through his efforts at reading Eliot; Guha effects a literary turn and rescues Eliot from purely materialist readings which Eliot himself would not have been able to recognise. Let the review speak for itself: -/- "We knew about Baudelaire and his flamboyant short life. But how many of us know of Baudelaire’s spirituality? Guha writes that Baudelaire had a profound understanding “of Original Sin” (92). It is another (...) matter that, as Guha points out, Eliot too shared this Baudelairian sense of Original Sin (92). Before reading this book, the reviewer was aware of Eliot’s self-confessed Christianity, but there exists no work where Baudelaire’s views on spirituality have been connected to Eliot’s poetry and criticism. Guha’s genius unearths for us a new Baudelaire and a new Eliot. Who would have thought before Guha researched Eliot that Baudelaire took a dim view of Victor Hugo being opaque to spirituality? In fact, Guha’s Baudelaire is not a picaresque avant garde, he is a young man searching for the numinous.". (shrink)

This chapter of Victor Lowe's Alfred North Whitehead: The Man and His Work, Volume II: 1910-1947 covers the development of Whitehead's philosophy of physics while he was Professor of Applied Mathematics at the Imperial College, London. Under the influence of Einstein's theory of relativity, Whitehead developed a theory of extension that explained the basis of the space-time manifold in terms of an ontology of events. Pan-physics was his term for the unification of the natural sciences as one general (...) science. (shrink)

The book outlines the contribution of passivity to the constitution of phenomena as diverse as temporal syntheses, perceptual associations, memory fulfillment and cross-cultural communication.

This article presents Nietzsche's notion of the Übermensch (le surhomme in French) as a development of romanticism conceived of as a quest to reveal the sentiment that defines or characterizes each individual as an individual. This approach reveals the affinities between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, notably with respect to Schopenhauer's notion of Will that Nietzsche transforms into that of the Will to power, thereby underscoring what can be considered as Nietzsche's individualism. We argue that as a romantic notion, the notion of (...) Übermensch fashions an ideal of what life could be but overlooks the importance of otherness and the role that otherness plays in defining the individual. Going beyond Nietzsche implies that the Übermensch, as a logical construct neglects the desire to please that constitutes an important part of an individual's relation with otherness. (shrink)

This book explores the literature on spirituality as an important dimension of psychology, and explains the relationship between psychological treatment and ...

If a God exists who plays an important role in the world and in human lives, then that God should be detectable by his actions. We should see evidence for his existence in physics and cosmology. We do not. We should see evidence in biology. We do not. We should see evidence in people’s lives. We do not. In no case is it necessary to introduce an immaterial, spiritual element to explain the universe. All our observations of the world look (...) just as they should look if there is no God. (shrink)